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Lewyn: Disparate Impact, and Restrictive Zoning

RECENT CASE LAW, DISPARATE IMPACT, AND RESTRICTIVE
ZONING
Michael Lewyn, Esq.*
ABSTRACT
The Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) 1 prohibits housing
discrimination, including the refusal to sell or rent housing based on
race, color, religion, sex, familial status or national origin, 2 and any
policy or conduct that “otherwise make[s] unavailable or den[ies], a
dwelling [based on these impermissible factors].”3 In 2015, the
Supreme Court interpreted the “otherwise make unavailable” language
of the Act to mean that the FHA includes not only claims for
intentional discrimination, but also claims for disparate impact. 4
Under the disparate impact doctrine, a defendant may be liable for
facially neutral rules or policies that disproportionately favor one racial
group over another.5
Zoning law often disfavors Blacks and Hispanics by limiting
housing supply and increasing housing costs.6 Zoning codes generally
*

Associate Professor, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center. B.A.,
Wesleyan University, J.D., University of Pennsylvania, L.L.M., University of
Toronto. I would like to thank Thomas Maligno for his helpful comments.
1
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619.
2
42 U.S.C. § 3604(a). The FHA also prohibits discrimination based on gender,
religion, or familial status. Id.
3
42 U.S.C. § 3604(a).
4
See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc., 576 U.S.
519, 534-35 (2015) (explaining why “otherwise make available” language supports
disparate impact claims).
5
Id. at 531-33, 540-42 (explaining disparate impact concept).
6
See A. Mechele Dickerson, Systemic Racism and Housing, 70 EMORY L.J. 1535,
1561 (2021) (race-neutral zoning laws that “make it harder to build affordable
housing . . . disproportionately affect[] Blacks and Latinos”); Keith Aoki, Direct
Democracy, Racial Group Agency, Local Government Law and Racial Segregation:
Some Reflections on Radical and Plural Democracy, 33 CAL. W. L. REV. 185, 197
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limit the number of houses or apartments that can be built on a parcel
of land.7 By restraining the overall supply of residences, these
“minimum lot size”8 regulations make housing more costly. 9 Zoning
codes also make housing expensive in a variety of other ways; for
example, zoning codes typically separate houses from apartments, thus
limiting the supply of apartments. 10 Because studies show that Blacks
and Hispanics, on average, have lower incomes than Whites, 11
minimum lot size requirements also tend to exclude Blacks and

(1997) (historically, zoning regulations “effectively kept lower and working-class
Blacks and Latinas/os from White neighborhoods via minimum lot size
requirements, minimum home cost requirements, and segregation or outright
prohibition of multifamily rental units”); Maya Brennan et al., How Zoning Shapes
Our
Lives,
HOUSING
MATTERS
(June
12,
2019),
https://housingmatters.urban.org/articles/how-zoning-shapes-ourlives#:~:text=Restrictive%20zoning%20limits%20the%20housing%20supply%20a
nd%20raises,and%20more%20than%204%20percent%20to%20home%20prices
(explaining the relationship between zoning and housing costs); Chasity Henry, Knot
Today: A Look at Hair Discrimination in the Workplace and at Schools, 46 T.
MARSHALL L. REV. 56, 56 (2021) (Blacks tend to have lower incomes than Whites);
John Mitchell, Suspending Prisoners’ Social Security Benefits: Yet Another Blow to
Financially Vulnerable African American and Hispanic Families, 20 SEATTLE J. FOR
SOC. JUST. 149, 149 (2021) (showing similar results as to Hispanic households).
7
See Paul Boudreaux, Lotting Large: The Phenomenon of Minimum Lot Size Laws,
68 ME. L. REV. 1, 2 (2016) (“A dominant feature of American metropolitan areas is
large lot zoning — the policy through which only house lots of a minimum size are
permitted”). See also id. at 6 (citing examples from various metropolitan areas).
8
Id. at 2 (using term in title).
9
Id. at 9-10.
10
See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (upholding such
separation because apartments near houses “come very near to being nuisances”);
Robert L. Liberty, Abolishing Exclusionary Zoning: A Natural Policy Alliance for
Environmentalists and Affordable Housing Advocates, 30 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
581, 582 (2003) (after the early twentieth century, “many city planners treated
apartments . . . [as] noxious”). I note that anti-apartment laws and minimum lot size
laws are not the only regulations that raise housing costs. See, e.g., Michael Lewyn
& Shane Cralle, Planners Gone Wild: The Overregulation of Parking, 33 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 613, 618 (2006-2007) (government requires landlords to provide
tenants with parking; these regulations increase housing costs for nondrivers by
forcing landlords to bundle the cost of parking together with rent).
11
See Henry, supra note 6, at 29 (stating that median household income for white
households is over $76,000, while median household income for black households is
just under $46,000); Mitchell, supra note 6, at 109 (median income for Hispanic
households just over $50,000).
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Hispanics from the municipalities and neighborhoods with the strictest
limits.12
Because zoning raises housing costs, one might think that the
disparate impact doctrine can easily be used to limit zoning. The
purpose of this article is to examine recent case law to determine
whether this is accurate. Part I of the Article describes the background
of disparate impact law under the FHA, and Part II focuses on the most
recent disparate impact case law in cases involving the types of zoning
restrictions discussed above.

12

See Aoki, supra note 6, at 197 (mentioning minimum lot size requirements as one
example of a race-neutral zoning law with discriminatory results).
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EARLY DISPARATE IMPACT CASE LAW

The FHA was enacted in 1968.13 Not long after the FHA’s
enactment, lower courts began to address the disparate impact concept.
For example, in the 1974 case, United States v. City of Black Jack,
Missouri,14 the federal government brought an FHA claim challenging
a zoning code that prohibited the construction of any new multifamily
dwellings 15 in a “virtually all-white” suburb16 of St. Louis.17 The
Eighth Circuit held that, to establish a prima facie case under the FHA,
the federal government was not required to show that the suburb
intended to discriminate. 18 Instead, the government need only show
“that [the suburbs’ actions] ha[ve] a discriminatory effect.” 19 The
court endorsed the disparate impact theory because “clever men may
easily conceal their motivations, but more importantly, because . . . the
arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and unfair to
private rights and the public interest as the perversity of a willful
scheme.”20 Once a prima facie case of discrimination was established,
the suburb could prevail only if it demonstrated that its zoning was
“necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.” 21 The
Eighth Circuit found that no such compelling state interest existed and,
accordingly, rejected the suburb’s zoning. 22
Other circuit court decisions, even those upholding disparate
impact claims, allowed municipalities somewhat more discretion. For
example,23 in the 1988 case, Huntington Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Town
13

See United States v. West Peachtree Tenth Corp., 437 F.2d 221, 222 (5th Cir. 1971)
(referring to “Fair Housing Act of 1968”).
14
508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974).
15
Id. at 1181.
16
Id. at 1183.
17
See St. Louis Suburb Ends 12-Year Housing Fight, NEW YORK TIMES (Feb. 25,
1982), at 26, https://www.nytimes.com/1982/02/25/us/st-louis-suburb-ends-12-yearhousing-fight.html (describing Black Jack as “suburb of St. Louis” and
“predominantly white community”).
18
See 508 F.2d at 1185 (“The plaintiff need make no showing whatsoever that the
action resulting in racial discrimination in housing was racially motivated.”)
(Footnote omitted).
19
Id. at 1184.
20
Id. at 1185.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 1186-88.
23
Cf. Jonathan Zasloff, The Price of Equality: Fair Housing, Land Use, and
Disparate Impact, 48 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 98, 119 (2017) (cases after Black
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of Huntington,24 a variety of plaintiffs challenged a town’s prohibition
of multifamily housing in all but a tiny fraction of that municipality. 25
The U.S. Court of Appeals held that the disparate impact approach was
applicable to FHA claims, primarily because courts had upheld
disparate impact claims under similarly worded civil rights statutes.26
The court also noted that discriminatory intent may be difficult to
prove, because “clever men may easily conceal their motivations.” 27
But rather than adopting the Black Jack court’s “compelling
governmental interest” test, 28 the Second Circuit held that once a prima
facie case of disparate impact was shown,29 the court should focus on
“(1) whether the reasons [for the policy] are bona fide and legitimate
and (2) whether any less discriminatory alternative can serve those
ends.”30 Applying this test, the court found that the town’s
justifications could be met by less restrictive means.31 For example,
the town argued that restricting multifamily zoning to a small part of
the town would encourage multifamily development in that
neighborhood; the court responded that this goal could be achieved
through less discriminatory means, such as tax abatements for
development in that area.32
Most post-Huntington disparate impact claims, however, were
unsuccessful. Between 1970 and 2013, plaintiffs received positive

Jack “pulled back somewhat” from the Black Jack court’s “compelling governmental
interest” test); Stacy E. Seicshnaydre, Is Disparate Impact Having Any Impact? An
Appellate Analysis of Forty Years of Disparate Impact Claims Under The Fair
Housing Act, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 357, 367-74 (2013) (describing numerous cases);
Metro. Dev. Co. v. Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 1977) (holding
that in disparate impact cases, courts should balance the strength of plaintiff’s
evidence, the evidence (if any) of discriminatory intent, the strength of the public
interest favoring municipal policy, and whether the plaintiff sought to compel
government action or prevent government interference).
24
844 F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1988), aff’d in part, 488 U.S. 15 (1988).
25
Id. at 928 (zoning code limited multifamily housing to “small urban renewal
zone”).
26
Id. at 935 (noting comparisons with Title VII and Title VIII of the Civil Rights
Act).
27
Id. (quoting Black Jack, 508 F.2d at 1185).
28
See United States v. Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1185 (8th Cir. 1974).
29
See Huntington Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 939 (2d Cir.
1988).
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id.
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outcomes in less than twenty percent of all FHA disparate impact
claims considered by federal appellate courts. 33 Courts have become
even more hostile to disparate impact claims in recent decades;
plaintiffs prevailed in 13% of disparate impact claims (three out of
twenty-three federal appellate cases) in the 1990s, and only 8.3% of
such claims (three out of thirty-six cases) in the 2000s.34
For example, in Reinhart v. Lincoln County,35 a county enacted
a land use plan that allowed higher-density housing on only ten percent
of the land covered by the plan. 36 The plaintiffs claimed that this
regulation (among others) would make houses less affordable to
members of racial minorities. 37 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit held that to establish a prima facie case, plaintiffs needed
to show that the defendant’s “policy caused a significant disparate
effect on a protected group.”38 The court found that increases in
housing cost caused by the policy did not establish such a prima facie
case, because “it may be that no members of protected groups could
afford houses in the [plaintiffs’] development even if the former
development regulations stayed in place.” 39 Instead, the court required
“evidence indicating before-and-after costs of dwellings and the
percentages of protected and nonprotected persons who will be priced
out of the market as a result of the increase.”40 Because the plaintiffs
had failed to provide such evidence, the court dismissed their claim
without addressing the justification for the county’s plan. 41
The Supreme Court finally addressed FHA disparate impact
claims in the 2015 case of Texas Department of Community Affairs v.

33

See Seicshnaydre, supra note 23, at 393-94.
Id.
35
482 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 2007).
36
Id. at 1226.
37
Id. at 1227.
38
Id. at 1229 (citation omitted).
39
Id. at 1230.
40
Id. at 1230-31.
41
Id. at 1231. The court added that if a prima facie case had been established, the
burden shifted to the defendant to show a legitimate reason for its policy. Id. at 1229
(citation omitted). If the defendant had done so, the court would then have applied
a balancing test similar to that suggested in Arlington Heights (court weighs degree
of disparate impact, strength of defendant’s justification, and whether the plaintiff
seeks to compel government action or whether to merely avoid interference with
individual property owners) (citation omitted). Id. See also Zasloff, supra note 23,
at 120 (describing Arlington Heights decision).
34
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Inclusive Communities Project.42 The Court noted that lower courts
unanimously endorsed the disparate impact theory, 43 and agreed with
this view on three grounds. 44 First, the Court pointed out that it had
interpreted similarly-worded statutes to allow disparate impact
claims.45 Just as the FHA makes it unlawful to “refuse to sell or rent .
. . or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person
because of race [or other prohibited considerations],” 46 Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 47 makes it unlawful to “fail or refuse to hire
or discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate . . . because
of such individual’s race [or other prohibited considerations],” 48 and
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) 49 makes it
unlawful to “fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or
otherwise discriminate . . . because of such individual’s age . . . .”50
Because Title VII and the ADEA are worded similarly to the FHA, and
the Court had upheld disparate impact claims under both statutes, it
logically followed that a disparate impact claim was also appropriate
under the FHA. 51 In particular, the Court focused on the “otherwise”
language in all three statutes, describing them as “catchall phrases
looking to consequences, not intent.”52
Second, the Court found that the FHA’s 1988 amendments
supported its decision.53 By 1988, nine federal Courts of Appeals had
endorsed FHA disparate impact liability. 54 The legislative history of
the 1988 amendments suggests that Congress was aware of this
precedent, and yet Congress made no effort to prohibit disparate
impact claims.55 Moreover, the 1988 amendments seemed to

42

576 U.S. 519 (2015).
Id. at 535.
44
See infra notes 45, 53, 60 (and accompanying text).
45
576 U.S. at 530-33.
46
42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (emphasis added).
47
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e17.
48
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added).
49
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634.
50
29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (emphasis added).
51
See Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys., 576 U.S. 519, 530-33
(2015).
52
Id. at 535.
53
Id. at 536-38.
54
Id. at 536 (citations omitted).
55
Id. at 536-37.
43
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presuppose the existence of a disparate impact claim.56 For example,
one such amendment57 provided that nothing in the FHA “limits the
applicability of any reasonable . . . restrictions regarding the maximum
number of occupants permitted to occupy a [residence].” 58 Since
occupancy restrictions might not be motivated by discriminatory
intent, Congress would not have bothered to exempt them from FHA
liability unless it had believed that they might be actionable under the
disparate impact doctrine. 59
Third, the Court held that the disparate impact doctrine was
“consistent with the FHA’s central purpose”60 because it allowed
courts to strike down arbitrary restrictions that harmed racial
minorities 61 and “plays a role in uncovering discriminatory intent . . .
[and in particular,] unconscious prejudices and disguised animus that
escape easy classification as [discriminatory intent].”62
But the Court limited the disparate impact doctrine in ways that
protected at least some land use regulation. 63 In particular, the Court
held that if an FHA plaintiff established a prima facie case of disparate
impact, a public or private defendant could rebut the prima facie case
by showing that its policy served a valid interest. 64 Even if the
defendant does so, the plaintiff may still prevail if it shows that an
alternative practice “has less disparate impact and serves the [entity’s]

56

Id. at 537-38.
42 U.S.C. § 3607(b)(1).
58
576 U.S. at 537 (citation omitted).
59
Id. at 537-38.
60
Id. at 539.
61
Id. at 539-40.
62
Id. at 540.
63
Id. at 541.
64
Id. (explaining that defendants may show that a policy “is necessary to achieve a
valid interest”).
57
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legitimate needs.”65 Thus, the Court reaffirmed lower court precedent
allowing FHA disparate impact claims. 66
II.

POST-INCLUSIVE COMMUNITIES CASE LAW

After the Supreme Court upheld the disparate impact doctrine
in Inclusive Communities,67some commentators suggested that the
days of anti-housing zoning were numbered. 68 For example, one
article, published in 2017, suggests that “[e]xclusionary zoning that
clusters housing by type . . . is ripe for invalidation.”69 Two postInclusive Communities district court decisions have held that
municipal zoning decisions limiting multifamily housing violate the
disparate impact doctrine;70 however, both cases are so narrowly
written as to suggest that such zoning is invalid only under the
narrowest of circumstances.

Id. at 533 (citation omitted). I note that the Court’s language closely tracked that
of a regulation issued by the federal Department of Housing and Urban
Development. Id. at 527 (explaining that under regulation, defendant may rebut
prima facie case of disparate impact by showing that defendant’s “practice is
necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory
interests” and plaintiff may rebut this showing “upon proving that the substantial,
legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests supporting the challenged practice could be
served by another practice that has a less discriminatory effect”) (citations omitted);
MHANY Mgmt. v. County of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 618-19 (2d Cir. 2016)
(discussing that the three-part test is based on HUD regulation, because federal courts
should defer to agency’s reasonable interpretations of FHA).
66
See 576 U.S. at 535 (noting that lower courts had generally endorsed disparate
impact theory).
67
Id. at 530-33.
68
Andrea J. Boyack, Side by Side: Revitalizing Urban Cores and Ensuring
Residential Diversity, 92 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 435, 462-63 (2017). Numerous articles
in the popular press have followed suit. See, e.g., Jerusalem Demsas, America’s
Racist Housing Rules Really Can be Fixed, VOX (Feb. 17, 2021),
https://www.vox.com/22252625/america-racist-housing-rules-how-to-fix
(suggesting that “it’s time to sue the suburbs” and discussing disparate impact
doctrine).
69
See, e.g., Boyack, supra note 68, at 462-63; Scott Beyer, Could The Fair Housing
Act Help Abolish Restrictive Zoning?, MKT. URBANISM REP. (Oct. 30, 2018),
https://marketurbanismreport.com/blog/could-the-fair-housing-act-help-abolishrestrictive-zoning (suggesting that all land use restrictions have disparate impact
against minorities by increasing housing costs).
70
See infra Sections II(A)-(B) and accompanying text.
65
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Avenue 6E v. City of Yuma: Proving a Prima Facie
Case

In Avenue 6E Investments, Inc. v. City of Yuma,71 a company
purchased land that was zoned for a minimum lot size of eight
thousand square feet, and asked the city to reduce the minimum lot size
to six thousand square feet. 72 The company intended to construct
moderately-priced, entry-level homes rather than low-income
housing;73 nevertheless, neighborhood residents complained that
“lower-priced homes would increase crime and lower property
values.”74 In response to these complaints, the city rejected the
company’s rezoning application, and the company responded by filing
suit under the FHA.75 The trial court granted the city’s motion for
summary judgment, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit reversed based on Inclusive Communities and remanded the
case to the trial court. 76
On remand, the city renewed its motion for summary
judgment,77 and the court denied the motion. 78 The court began by
holding that the company had established a prima facie case that the
rezoning denial had a disproportionately negative impact on

71

217 F. Supp. 3d 1040 (2017).
Id. at 1044.
73
Id.
74
Id. On remand, the court noted that this language was “racially charged . . . [and
thus] bolsters Plaintiffs’ disparate impact claim.” Id. at 1055.
75
Id. The company also alleged a discriminatory intent claim under the FHA and a
variety of constitutional claims. Id. at 1045-46. The constitutional claims were
dismissed. Id. The court did not directly address the discriminatory intent claim on
remand. Id. at 1043 (motion for summary judgment was limited to disparate impact
claim).
76
Id. In particular, the trial court found that the plaintiffs could not establish a prima
facie case of disparate impact as long as there were other housing opportunities that
were similar to the plaintiffs’ proposed development. Id. at 1045. The court held
that this test was not good law after Inclusive Communities. Id. at 1046.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 1058.
72
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Hispanics,79 based on testimony by the company’s expert. 80 The
expert testified that homes with lots that are six thousand square feet
near the company’s land typically sold for between $121,000 and
$171,000, while nearby homes on the larger lots required by the city’s
existing zoning sold for between $258,000 and $386,000.81 The expert
also testified that persons purchasing a home in the first price range
were roughly forty-five percent Hispanic, while persons purchasing
homes in the more expensive range were roughly thirty percent
Hispanic.82 The court held that this testimony was sufficient to show
a prima facie case of disparate impact. 83 The court added that the
company:
[D]id not just show that the denial of a request to lower
the density increases housing costs and that Hispanics
are generally less wealthy than whites in Yuma. Rather,
[the company] provided statistical evidence—based on
a pool of qualified home purchasers within the relevant
market area and during the relevant time frame—
regarding the racial makeup of those priced out of the
market as a result of the [zoning-related] price increase
. . . .”84
Thus, to establish a prima facie case of race-related disparate impact
discrimination, plaintiffs must be able to find a pool of homebuyers
who would benefit from plaintiffs’ proposed zoning and show that this
pool of homebuyers was racially different from a pool of homebuyers
governed by existing municipal zoning. These elements will often be
difficult to show. For example, suppose an FHA plaintiff wants to
build homes on two thousand square foot lots, and the relevant

79

Id. at 1048. The court also held that a genuine issue of material fact precluding
summary judgment existed as to the other two prongs of the Inclusive Communities
test: whether (a) the city had a legitimate basis for denying the rezoning request, and
(b) whether a less discriminatory alternative existed to the rezoning denial. Id. at
1058. However, the court’s discussion of both issues was partially related to the
plaintiff’s proposal to allow a low-density buffer between its property and nearby
property–a problem that seems to me to be unlikely to recur in other cases, and thus
not worth discussing above. Id. at 1057-58.
80
Id. at 1048-50.
81
Id. at 1048-49.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id. at 1050.
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neighborhood or municipality has no areas zoned for such small
homes. In that situation, plaintiff might not be able to prove that the
smaller homes will cost less than the homes required by existing
zoning, nor will the plaintiff be able to prove the racial makeup of
persons buying these hypothetical homes. 85 It logically follows that
the Avenue 6E case may not be relevant to most zoning-related FHA
lawsuits.
B.

MHANY Management v. Nassau County

The case of MHANY Management v. County of Nassau86 arose
out of Nassau County’s sale of a government building to a private
developer.87 The building was located in the Village of Garden City,
a Long Island municipality which, in response to public pressure,
rezoned the land to “Residential-Townhouse,” a classification
designed to allow primarily single-family dwelling units rather than
multifamily housing.88 The County then auctioned off the property to
a developer of single-family houses.89 Two organizations and several
individual plaintiffs sued Garden City under the FHA, asserting that
the shift from multifamily zoning to Residential-Townhouse zoning
was racially discriminatory.90
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit issued a
decision shortly after the Inclusive Communities decision was issued.91
The court mentioned, without much discussion, that plaintiffs had
I note that this does not mean that a plaintiff must identify “with specificity those
who would have purchased a home within Plaintiffs’” proposed development.” Id.
at 1052. However, the court emphasized that the plaintiff “used a pool of qualified
persons–those who did in fact purchase homes in Yuma in the predicted price range.”
Id.
86
819 F.3d 581 (2d Cir. 2016).
87
Id. at 589.
88
Id. at 590-97 (describing municipal zoning process).
89
Id. at 597.
90
Id. at 598. In addition, plaintiffs also alleged claims under the Fourteenth
Amendment and a variety of non-FHA statutes; these claims were upheld by the trial
court but were not addressed in the Second Circuit’s decision. Id. Nassau County
was a defendant as well; however, the court dismissed the FHA claim against the
County. Id. at 625 (holding that trial court properly dismissed FHA claim against
County, but reversing dismissal of non-FHA claims).
91
The Second Circuit’s decision was issued on March 23, 2016, id. at 581, less than
a year after Inclusive Communities was issued in June of 2015. See Tex. Dep’t of
Hous. & Cmty. Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 576 U.S. 519, 519 (2015).
85
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established a prima facie case, 92 but remanded to the trial court for
consideration of whether plaintiffs met their burden of establishing “an
available alternative practice that has less disparate impact and serves
Defendants’ legitimate nondiscriminatory interests.” 93
On remand, 94 the trial court divided the case into two separate
issues: (1) whether the plaintiffs’ proposed alternative rezoning plan
was in fact less discriminatory than Garden City’s zoning,95 and (2)
whether this alternative would be effective in meeting the defendants’
interests.96
As to the first issue, the court found that multifamily zoning
would “have provided for a significantly larger percentage of minority
households than the pool of potential renters in the [City’s] zoning.” 97
The court relied on expert testimony asserting that under multifamily
zoning, the plaintiffs would have been able to build up to seventy-eight
units of “Section 8 [low-income] housing.”98 Because eighty-eight
percent of households on the local Section 8 waiting list were Black
and Hispanic, such zoning would have allowed over sixty additional
minority families to live in Garden City. 99 Thus, the plaintiffs’
proposed zoning would have had a more positive impact upon Black
and Hispanic householders than Garden City’s homeowner-oriented
zoning.
Because the court relied on the possibility of subsidized lowincome housing, its decision on this issue is of limited precedential
impact. If the plaintiffs had proposed to build market-rate middle-

92

819 F.3d at 620 (noting without extended discussion that the restriction on
multifamily housing “decreases the availability of housing to minorities”) (citation
omitted).
93
Id. at 619. In a decision that preceded Inclusive Communities, the district court
entered judgment for the plaintiffs on both the disparate impact claim and an FHA
discriminatory intent claim. Id. at 599 (decision issued in 2014).
94
MHANY Mgmt. v. County of Nassau, No. 05-cv-2301(ADS)(ARL), 2017 WL
4174787, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2017).
95
Id. at *4 (discussing the plaintiffs’ alternative zoning plan of designating that part
of Garden City as a multifamily area).
96
Id. at *7.
97
Id. at *4.
98
Id. at *5 (citation omitted). “Section 8 housing” is federally subsidized housing
for lower-income households. Cf. Comm’n on Hum. Rts. & Opportunities v.
Sullivan Assocs., 739 A.2d 238, 245-46 (Conn. 1999) (discussing how the Section 8
program enables lower-income tenants to rent housing from private landlords).
99
MHANY Mgmt., 2017 WL 4174787, at *5.
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income housing rather than government-subsidized housing for the
poor, the plaintiffs might have been unable to prove that such housing
would be disproportionately occupied by Blacks or Hispanics.100
Thus, the court might have found that the proposed zoning plan would
have had the same racial impact as the stricter zoning endorsed by the
municipal defendant.
Since the Second Circuit found that Garden City had legitimate
interests in limiting traffic and preventing overcrowding in public
schools,101 the court went on to address whether multifamily zoning
would be effective in meeting those interests. 102 The court held that
multifamily zoning would meet the city’s interest to avoid school
overcrowding, because multifamily development would in fact
generate fewer school children than the single-family houses supported
by Garden City.103
The court also held that multifamily zoning would meet the
city’s interest in limiting traffic, by comparing the multifamily zoning
with the property’s prior use as governmental offices.104 The court
found that even though multifamily housing generated slightly more
100

For example, suppose that the single-income housing favored by the city cost
$900,000, and the middle-income housing favored by plaintiffs cost $600,000. If the
overwhelming majority of Blacks and Hispanics could not afford the $600,000
houses, the court might have held that allowing such housing would not be less
discriminatory than prohibiting such housing.
101
MHANY Mgmt. v. County of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 620 (2d Cir. 2016)
(“Defendants identified legitimate, bona fide governmental interests, such as
increased traffic and strain on public schools.”). Garden City also claimed that it had
interests in creating townhouses, creating a transition zone between single-family
homes and commercial districts, and maintaining neighborhood character. MHANY
Mgmt., 2017 WL 4174787, at *5-6. However, the courts found that these interests
were “either not actual interests, or were not legitimate, substantial, or nondiscriminatory interests.” Id. at *5.
102
Garden City asked the court to find that plaintiffs could not prevail unless
multifamily zoning was “as equally effective as [the City’s] zoning in serving the
Village’s interests.” Id. at *7 (emphasis added). The court disagreed, holding that
the plaintiffs’ alternative need only be somewhat effective in serving the defendant’s
interests. Id. at *8-9 (interpreting both HUD regulations and appellate precedent to
mean that plaintiffs’ alternative must serve defendant’s legitimate interests but need
not be as effective in serving those interests as the policy challenged by plaintiffs).
103
Id. at *9-10.
104
Id. at *1 (explaining that before rezoning, property at issue was zoned as “Public
Use” or “P zone”). “[T]he Court will analyze whether either [party’s proposed]
zoning would have reduced the traffic in relation to the conditions under the P zone.
. . .” Id. at *11.
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traffic than single-family housing,105 office buildings generated far
more traffic than either type of housing. 106 Thus, “the elimination of
government office buildings and the development of residential
housing would have reduced traffic, whether the residences were
single or multi family.”107 It follows that, because the plaintiffs’
proposed zoning reduced traffic below prior levels, the plaintiffs met
their burden of proving that their nondiscriminatory alternative in fact
served Garden City’s interest in reducing traffic. 108
Thus, MHANY stands for the proposition that zoning that
allows multifamily housing will satisfy government’s interest in
reducing traffic where prior to such zoning, property was zoned for
office use. But, in cases where the same property was zoned for singlefamily housing or less dense multifamily housing, MHANY will not be
on point. In fact, the court’s suggestion that single-family housing
generates slightly less traffic than multifamily housing suggests that
plaintiffs who challenge restrictive zoning are unlikely to prevail
where current laws zone property for single-family housing.
III.

CONCLUSION

In sum, post-Inclusive Communities case law has upheld
challenges to restrictive zoning. However, the two most relevant
decisions have been drafted so narrowly that they may aid very few
FHA plaintiffs.
One of the cases, Avenue 6E, holds that restrictive zoning has
a discriminatory effect where FHA plaintiffs can demonstrate that
there is nearby housing that is (1) otherwise comparable to the zoning
change that they seek, (2) less costly than housing governed by the
zoning they challenge, and (3) more likely to be inhabited by Blacks
or Hispanics.109 Another case, MHANY, shows that restrictive zoning
has a discriminatory effect where the plaintiffs’ proposed zoning is
likely to (1) lead to government-subsidized housing that (2) is likely to
Id. (citing testimony that “eliminating multi-family housing only reduced peak
traffic by 3%.”).
106
Id. (citing study showing that “office use generated 50% more traffic than the
planned multi residential use”).
107
Id.
108
Id. at 12.
109
See Avenue 6E, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1048-50 (finding a prima facie case of disparate
impact based on testimony to this effect).
105
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be disproportionately used by Blacks or Hispanics.110 It follows that
where the plaintiffs seek to create market-rate housing, and cannot find
data to show the likely costs of such housing, they will be unable to
show that restrictive zoning has discriminatory effects.111
Once FHA plaintiffs have shown that existing zoning has a
discriminatory effect and a defendant has responded by showing that
the status quo is justified by the public interest in reducing automobile
traffic, the burden shifts to the plaintiffs to show that less restrictive
zoning is effective in holding down traffic. 112 MHANY shows that this
burden may be met if the prior zoning is for a traffic-generating
commercial use such as offices—but not if the prior zoning is for
single-family housing. Thus, it is unclear how frequently MHANY will
justify overturning the zoning status quo.

110

See MHANY Mgmt., 2017 WL 4174787, at *4-5 (finding liability based on these
facts).
111
Id.
112
Id. at *3-4.
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